We study the impact of strategic choices of self-interested candidates of whether or not to enter an election. We focus on strategic candidacy in the context of the tree and binary voting procedures used in many settings, including committees. We o er a comprehensive analysis for the special but important case of voting by successive elimination. Strategic candidacy slightly enlarges the set of candidates that can be equilibrium outcomes relative to the traditional analysis which takes the set of candidates as xed. Pareto dominated candidates can be elected in equilibrium under voting by successive elimination when strategic candidacy is considered, in contrast with a xed set of candidates.
Introduction
Many voting processes can be viewed as a two-stage process, where in a rst stage candidates decide on whether or not they will enter the election, and then in a second stage a voting procedure selects from the candidates who have entered. Strategic behavior in the stage where candidates make entry decisions can be just as important as strategic voting in the second stage. Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000) (henceforth DJL) show that strategic candidacy can a ect the outcomes of all non-dictatorial voting procedures. Since those results show that it is impossible to avoid strategic candidacy, the following question naturally arises: \What are the outcomes of voting procedures when one accounts for the implications of strategic candidacy?" This paper answers this question for a speci c, but important, class of voting procedures widely used in committee elections. This is the class of binary voting procedures, where a sequence of majority votes are held over pairs of choices.
In the rst part of this paper we establish some facts about the impact of strategic candidacy for the class of binary voting procedures. Accounting for strategic candidacy expands the set of outcomes of binary voting procedures relative to that predicted under the traditional analysis with a xed set of candidates. However, we show that the outcomes under strategic candidacy still remain in the top cycle (and thus select a Condorcet winner if one exists).
In the second part of the paper, we examine the impact of strategic candidacy in more detail, focusing on the speci c procedure of voting by successive elimination. Voting by successive elimination is a prominent voting procedure used in many committee, parliamentary, and legislative settings. It is also a voting procedure that has been well-studied in the context of a xed set of candidates, and thus provides a nice benchmark for a detailed analysis of the e ects of strategic candidacy. Under voting by successive elimination, candidates are ordered and then compared pairwise. So, for instance, the rst and the second candidates are put to a vote. The losing candidate is eliminated, and the winning candidate is then matched against the third candidate, and so on. For a xed set of candidates, pro le of voters' preferences, and ordering of candidates, a single winner emerges. This has been nicely characterized via an algorithm due to Shepsle and Weingast (1984) . Moreover, Banks (1985) characterized the set of winners when all possible orderings of candidates are considered. This set, which we refer to as the Banks set, has nice properties and in particular is a subset of the uncovered set and thus always selects a Pareto e cient candidate.
We provide a parallel analysis to that of Banks (1985) , when the only change is that the set of candidates is endogenized through a candidacy game where candidates decide on whether or not to enter the election. The voting procedure then takes place only over the candidates who have decided to enter. Examining an equilibrium of this overall game leads to a prediction of who will enter in the rst stage, and ultimately who will win the election. Most importantly, it can lead to a di erent winning candidate compared to the case where the set of candidates is xed exogenously. We end up with a well-identi ed set of possible outcomes that we call the \candidate stable set" and which we fully characterize. Several points are worth mentioning about the candidate stable set. First, the candidate stable set is larger than the Banks set. Thus, for this class of voting procedures, accounting for strategic candidacy enlarges the set of winning candidates. Second, the candidate stable set has an intuitive relationship to the Banks set that we outline in detail in the characterization. Third, the candidate stable set is a superset of the uncovered set, but is only \slightly" larger than the uncovered set, in a precise sense. Unfortunately, this admits some Pareto ine cient outcomes.
Before proceeding to the body of our analysis, let us brie y discuss the relationship of this work to the most closely related literature.
The Related Literature
We have already mentioned the connection of DJL with the present paper. There are also other papers which discuss the issue of strategic candidacy from di erent perspectives. Besley and Coate(1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) provided some of the rst analyses of the e ects of candidate entry decisions in the context of large elections with plurality rule and ideological positions of the candidates. While there is some overlap in spirit of our analysis and these predecessors, the analysis that we provide here di ers in a number of dimensions, including the voting procedures analyzed, the nite number of voters, the costless entry of candidates, and arbitrary preferences over candidates that voters may hold. So, roughly, they are concerned with the e ects of candidate entry in in plurality elections involving a large number of voters, while we concentrate on the e ects of strategic candidacy in voting procedures which are more likely to be used in committee settings. Dutta and Pattanaik (1978) analyze a setting where in a rst stage (before voting) individuals sponsor or propose alternatives out of a set. Next, in a second stage, voting takes place over the set of proposed alternatives. Their main result is to show that there are circumstances under which sponsors indulge in strategic behavior by not proposing their most preferred alternatives. Thus, their paper, like this one, is a contribution to the topic of endogenous formation of the agenda. 1 In this paper we interpret the alternatives to be elected as candidates running for an election. The main restriction with that interpretation is that they can only decide to enter or not, and cannot force (or nominate) some other candidate to run. More generally, it might be some other set of potential alternatives, for instance the possible amendments to a motion in a legislative context, that are being considered. Games of this kind have been analyzed in a series of papers by Banks and Gasmi (1987) , AustenSmith (1987) , Ordeshook and Schwartz (1987) and Groseclose and Krehbiel (1993) ). 2 The main focus of those papers is to understand when it is that the endogenously proposed agenda leads to situations where the subsequent sophisticated voting strategies coincide with sincere (myopic) voting. The clever and important insight coming out of those papers is that under voting by successive elimination (and only under voting by successive elimination, see Groseclose and Krehbiel for a simple proof) a proposer can only have an impact on the overall voting by proposing something that will be voted up at its turn -which under the sophisticated voting requires that the proposed alternative beat each of the proposals which follow in the voting (which are those previously proposed). Thus the equilibrium proposals form a sequence for which each proposal beats all the previous ones, and sophisticated voting then coincides with sincere voting. This ends up having some relation to our characterization of when candidates choose to enter. Despite the fact that these papers look at endogenous agenda formation in sequential voting procedures, there is no relationship to ours in terms of the issues addressed. We are interested in understanding how the set of alternatives that may be 1 See also Majumdar (1956) and Mueller (1978) . There is also a rich theoretical literature on the strategic e ects of agenda manipulation, which is not as closely related to our work, but still should be mentioned. See Ordeshook (1986) for a description of this literature.
2 See Ferejohn, Fiorina and McKelvey (1987) and Lockwood (1998) for analyses of the amendment procedure in the context of settings where a distribution of goods and projects is to be proposed. elected changes when the candidates are endogenized and looking at questions related to Pareto e ciency of the outcomes, while the above-mentioned papers are concerned with the relationship between sincere and sophisticated voting and do not examine any characteristics of the outcomes. 3 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we outline the setting and state some motivating and supporting results. In section 3 we proceed to an analysis of the e ects of strategic candidacy on binary voting procedures and then focus in on the e ects on voting by successive elimination. In section 4 we discuss issues concerning existence of equilibria in the candidacy game and issues arising due to the consideration of mixed strategies. An appendix contains all the proofs of formal statements.
De nitions and Preliminary Results
Candidates and Voters N = f1; : : :; ng is a nite set of individuals. C N is the set of potential candidates. We consider the case where #C 3, as the possibilities for strategic candidacy with just two potential candidates are trivial. V N is the set of voters. Let m = #V. Generic voters are denoted i; j; k.
Without loss of generality, assume that N = C V. In di erent situations it may be that C \ V 6 = ; (e.g., C = V, C V, etc.) or C \ V = ;. We discuss how the overlap between candidates and voters matters as it applies.
Preferences
Individuals have strict preferences over the set of candidates represented by a complete, transitive, and asymmetric binary relation, P i . Let P denote the set of all pro les of such strict preference relations. The notation P 2 P denotes a generic pro le P = (P 1 ; : : : ; P n ).
Let aR i b denote the situation where either aP i b or a = b.
Given any A C, let P i j A denote the binary relation on A induced by P i , and Pj A the pro le of induced relations.
Given any nonempty B C, let top(B; P i ) denote the candidate a 2 B such that aP i b for all b 2 B, b 6 = a.
In many situations it is natural to assume that a candidate nds himself or herself most preferred. 4 The restricted domain of preferences P r = fP 2 Pja 2 C ) top(C; P a ) = ag; captures this assumption.
Without such a domain restriction a basic problem can arise. For instance, in the extreme case where candidates nd themselves least preferred 5 any elected candidate prefers to exit.
Tournaments
In many contexts, the preferences of the voters can be summarized (even for strategic purposes) by the majority voting relation that is induced over pairs of candidates.
Given P 2 P r , denote by T(P) the binary relation de ned as follows :
T(P) is asymmetric and further, if #V is odd, T(P) is complete and therefore a tournament 6 , which is referred to as the majority tournament induced by P.
In the case where the number of voters is even, if we break ties in some arbitrary (but deterministic) manner, then T(P) is complete and a tournament.
As tournaments are not necessarily transitive relations there can exist cycles. One cycle of particular interest that we refer to in the sequel is the top cycle associated with a tournament.
For an arbitrary tournament T on C, the top cycle of T, denoted by TC(T) is the set fa 2 C : 8b 2 C; 9a 1 ; : : :; a k in C such that a 1 = a; a k = b and a i T a i+1 8i = 1; : : :; k ? 1g i.e. the set of candidates that can reach any other candidate in A via a T-chain of arbitrary length. For subsets of candidates, A C, there is a corresponding de nition and we denote that set TC(A; T). When there is no A indicated, then we are referring to the top cycle relative to C.
Voting Procedures
We model voting procedures as a choice by society from the set of available candidates. This general formulation allows for many applications and includes strategic voting as well as sincere voting.
A voting procedure is a function V : C n f;g P r ! C such that for all A C and P 2 P r (i) V (A; P) 2 A, (ii) V (A; P) = V (A; P 0 ) for all P 0 such that P i = P 0 i for all i 2 V, and (iii) V (A; P) = V (A; P 0 ) for all P 0 2 P r such that Pj A = P 0 j A .
Item (i) says that a voting procedure chooses from the set of available candidates A. The implicit assumption embodied in (i) is that V (A; P) is single-valued.
Item (ii) says that a voting procedure is determined only by voters' preferences. In our setting the pro le P includes a speci cation of candidates' preferences, and the candidates in some cases may not be voters.
Item (iii) says that the voting procedure depends only on preferences over the set of feasible (i.e. entering) candidates. This condition is similar to Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, except de ned over voting procedures instead of social welfare orderings.
Binary Voting Procedures
Much of our focus in this paper will be on the class of voting procedures where a sequence of votes are taken and each vote is over two options. These binary voting procedures are de ned as follows.
A binary tree on A C is an object (A) = (M; ; ) such that The mapping associates every node with its predecessor. Every node either has exactly two successors or no successors at all. Nodes which have no successors are called terminal nodes and are denoted by Z.
The interpretation is as follows. A majority vote is rst taken at m 0 over the two successor nodes to m 0 (which are the nodes in ?1 (m 0 )). Say the vote is for m 1 . If m 1 is a terminal node, then the elected candidate is (m 1 ). Otherwise the voting continues, and the vote is over the successor nodes to m 1 , and so on.
Under strategic voting, where voters anticipate the voting that will take place further down the tree when considering the vote at any node, the outcome of a binary voting procedure can easily be solved by a simple backward algorithm. The winner is called the sophisticated outcome of (A) at P 2 P r , denoted by S( (A); P), and is computed as follows: 7 Let Z 1 be the set of nodes whose successors are both terminal nodes. A mapping 1 : Z 1 ! A is de ned as follows. Let m 2 Z 1 and suppose ?1 (m) = fm 1 ; m 2 g. Denote (m 1 ) and (m 2 ) by a and b respectively. Then 1 (m) = a if aT(P)b and 1 (m) = b if bT(P)a. Let 1 (A) = (M 1 ; ; 1 ) be the binary tree where M 1 = MnZ. Note that Z 1 is now the set of terminal nodes of 1 (A). By repeating this operation t?times, we obtain a binary procedure t = (M t ; ; t ) where M t consists of m 0 and two successor nodes ?1 (m) = fm t 1 ; m t 2 g : Denote t (m t 1 ) and t (m t 2 ) by x and y respectively. Then, S( (A); P) = x if xT(P)y and S( (A); P) = y if yT(P)x.
A voting procedure V (:; :) is a binary voting procedure if there exists a set of binary trees f (A); A Cg such that for all P 2 P r for all A C, V (A; P) = S( (A); P). Dutta and Sen (1993) have shown that the class of binary voting procedures is a (strict) subset of the class of tree voting procedures. 8 Further, not only are binary voting procedures Condorcet consistent, 9 but the sophisticated outcome depends on the pro le P only through the induced tournament T(P), i.e., if two pro les P and P 0 lead to the same majority tournament, then they lead to the same sophisticated outcome. Therefore the class of binary voting procedures is a (strict) subset of the set of Condorcet consistent voting procedures.
The Candidacy Game A voting procedure V and a pro le P 2 P r give rise to a game, called hereafter the candidacy game. In this game, each candidate simultaneously decides on whether or not to enter the election.
More speci cally C is the set of players, and each player has two possible (pure) strategies of entering the election or not entering the election. A pro le of strategies of the candidates results in a set A C who enter. Candidate a evaluates two sets of entering candidates A and B by comparing V (A; P) and V (B; P) on the basis of P a . 10 When V itself arises from a game as is the case when V is a tree voting procedure or a binary voting procedure, then the candidacy game is simply the reduced form of a two-stage game where potential candidates decide simultaneously whether to enter the contest, and then voters vote according to some rule on the declared candidates. Under the reduced form candidates implicitly deduce the equilibrium outcome attached to each possible continuation game.
NE(V; P) denotes the sets of candidates that enter in the (pure strategy) Nash equilibria of the candidacy game induced by the voting procedure V and the pro le P 2 P r . So, NE(V; P) is the set of A C such that 8 A tree is essentially a nite extensive game form of perfect information, and a voting procedure is a tree voting procedure if the winner out of any set A and pro le P is the backwards induction solution of the tree on A corresponding to the pro le P. See Dutta and Sen( 1993) for formal de nitions.
9 Given a subset of candidates A C, a 2 A such that aT(P)b for all b 2 An fag is a Condorcet winner for P in A. A voting procedure V is Condorcet consistent if for all A C and all P 2 P r , V (A; P) = a whenever a is a Condorcet winner in A for P. 10 We have not speci ed V (;; P). However, regardless of the speci cation of the default choice V (;; P), any candidate a 6 = V (;; P) satis es V (fag; P)P a V (;; P). So pure strategy Nash equilibria (when they exist) have at least one candidate entering.
V (A; P)R a V (A n fag; P) for all a 2 A and V (A; P)R a V (A fag; P) for all a 2 C n A.
DJL say that a voting procedure is candidate stable if for all P 2 P r : C 2 N E(V; P). Candidate stability requires that it be a Nash equilibrium for all candidates to enter. Candidate stability is a weak way of capturing the idea that no candidate can strategically a ect the outcome of a voting procedure by withdrawing from a contest. It is weak in that it does not require anything like it to be a dominant strategy for candidates to enter. Further, candidate stability only requires that this be true when all candidates enter. That is, the condition only compares V (C; P) and V (C n fag; P), but makes no statement about the relationship between V (A; P) and V (A n fag; P) for A C.
They show that if C \ V = ; then the only candidate stable unanimous voting procedures are dictatorial. When C \ V 6 = ;, they exhibit examples of candidate stable tree voting procedures which are not dictatorial but they also show that any such procedure must violate a no-veto style condition.
We o er Proposition 1 below as the primary motivation behind our analysis of strategic candidacy in binary voting procedures. The result states that no binary voting procedure can be candidate stable. This result can be proven as a corollary to one of the results in DJL, but we o er a direct proof in the appendix here, as the case of binary voting procedures substantially simpli es the proof compared to the general class of voting procedures considered in DJL.
Proposition 1 If#V 6 = 4 11 and V is a binary voting procedure, then V is not candidate stable.
Before turning to an analysis of the e ects of strategic candidacy on binary voting procedures, we tackle one detail that greatly simpli es the subsequent analysis.
Separating Candidate Preferences and Tournaments
To keep the analysis relatively simple, we isolate the strategic candidacy problem from candidate voting decisions. That is, we \disconnect" the role of an individual who is a potential candidate from his possible role as a voter. This holds vacuously when C \ V = ;. Otherwise, one needs to identify conditions under which a candidate's preferences will not a ect the voting tournament, as we do below.
Let e P r be the subset of pro les P 2 P r such that V (A; P 0 ) = V (A; P) for all A C whenever P 0 i = P i for all i 2 VnC. The pro les in e P r are the pro les where the outcome (given any set of entering candidates), depends only on the preferences of voters who are not candidates. Therefore, when we restrict attention to these pro les, the preferences of candidates can have an in uence on the eventual outcome only through the candidates' strategies in the candidacy game.
Of course, for some voting procedures and pattern of C and V, e P r can be empty (e.g., when C = V). But more generally, g P r can be large. In the case where V is a binary voting procedure, we expect e P r to be nonempty not only when C \ V = ; (in which case it is equal to P r ), but also when C \ V is small as compared to V. This is formally stated in the proposition below (in the spirit of McGarvey (1953) ) which provides a bound on the number of voters required to ensure that any arbitrary tournament can be obtained as the majority relation corresponding to some pro le of preferences of the voters not in C, and independent of the preferences of individuals in C \ V. Proposition 2 validates some of the developments in section 4.
Proposition 2 Let #C = m and #(C \ V) = k. If k is even and #V (k+2)(m?1)m=2+k, or odd and #V (k+3)(m?1)m=2+k, then for any arbitrary tournament T over C there exists P VnC such that T = T(P VnC ; P V\C ) for any P V\C .
3 Accounting for Strategic Candidacy and Voting by Successive Elimination
We begin the analysis of strategic candidacy with a result that describes how the outcomes of binary voting procedures are a ected by strategic candidacy. The result shows that the set of elected candidates expands, but still remains within the top cycle. While a binary voting procedure V (A; P) = S( (A); P) is sensitive to the choice of the binary tree , the outcomes of all binary voting procedures have a property in common. McKelvey and Niemi (1978) showed that for all binary trees : S( (C); P) 2 T C(T (P)). That is, the sophisticated outcome of any binary voting procedure lies in the Top Cycle set of the majority tournament induced by the pro le of preferences. Proposition 3 below states that strategic candidacy does not alter this \upper bound" in that it cannot result in outcomes outside of the top cycle. Since outcomes outside the top cycle are usually considered bad within the class of Condorcet consistent voting procedures, we can say that strategic candidacy does not alter this nice feature. The proposition also states that sophisticated outcomes without strategic candidacy form a lower bound as to what the outcomes are accounting for strategic candidacy.
Given a binary voting procedure V and P 2 e P r , let e V (P) P 0 2 e P r :T(P 0 )=T(P) A2NE(V;P 0 ) V (A; P 0 ):
So e V is the set of all possible outcomes of the binary voting procedure V , when strategic candidacy is accounted for. In particular, given the separation of the voting tournament and the candidates' preferences, this set is computed allowing the preferences of the candidates to vary. So, for a xed tournament induced by voters' preferences we ask what are all the conceivable outcomes when we allow for strategic candidacy. By limiting our attention to the subset e P r of pro les, we are in a position to assert that any di erence between V (C; P) and e V (P) can be imputed to strategic candidacy e ects.
Proposition 3 Let V be a binary voting procedure. Then for all P 2 e P r , V (C; P) e V (P) TC(T(P)).
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is relatively straightforward. It is easy to see that e V (P) contains V (C; P) -if candidates all nd V (C; P) second most preferred (behind themselves) then it is an equilibrium of the candidacy game for all candidates to enter. To see that there is no equilibrium beyond the Top Cycle, note that TC(A; T(P)) TC(B; T(P)) whenever A B and A \ TC(B; T(P)) 6 = ;. This implies it cannot be an equilibrium of the candidacy game for none of the candidates in TC(C; T (P)) to enter. Suppose to the contrary that there is an equilibrium A 2 NE(V; P) where A\TC(C; T (P)) = ;. Then if some candidate in TC(C; T (P)) were to enter, she would necessarily win the binary voting procedure (and would in fact be the Condorcet winner among entering candidates).
The lower and upper bounds on e V (P) hold for any binary voting procedure. There are binary voting procedures hitting each of these bounds, and so the result is tight. However, in the context of speci c subclasses of binary voting procedures these two bounds can be considerably sharpened. We now examine the prominent class of voting by successive elimination, where we are able to pinpoint the e ects of strategic candidacy in even more detail.
Voting by Successive Elimination
We rst describe the voting by successive elimination procedure when all potential candidates show up. Let : C ! f1; : : : ; #Cg be an ordering (where is one-to-one) of candidates. Let us refer to the candidates by a 1 ; : : : ; a #C , where (a k ) = k. In the successive elimination procedure, a vote is rst taken to eliminate either a 1 or a 2 . The`winning' candidate from the rst round, denoted w 1 , is compared to a 3 , and a vote is taken to eliminate either w 1 or a 3 , and so on. After (#C ? 1) comparisons, the surviving candidate is declared to be the voting outcome.
At each stage, the elimination of one candidate is on the basis of majority voting. However, in order to determine the eventual voting outcome, it is also necessary to describe how voters act. We examine the case where they vote strategically at each stage, and so focus on the sophisticated voting outcome of this binary voting procedure.
Through a slight abuse of notation, we use for the ordering of candidates under voting by successive elimination, while we earlier used it to determine the ordering of nodes in a general binary voting procedure. Note that under voting by successive elimination, completely speci es the procedure.
Sophisticated Voting by Successive Elimination Shepsle and Weingast (1984) de ned an algorithm which can be used to determine the sophisticated outcome of the voting by successive elimination procedure for an arbitrary tournament T (and therefore for any tournament T(P) arising from majority aggregation of a P 2 P r ) and ordering of candidates on a set A C. This is described as follows.
The binary voting procedure corresponding to sophisticated voting by a tournament T on a set of candidates A that is ordered by , denoted 12 S(A; ; T), is w 1 , where w`= a`; and 8k < l; w k (A; T; ) = ( a k if a k Tw k 0 8k 0 > k; and w k+1 otherwise and where a 1 ; : : :; a`is the ordering on A consistent with (and`= #A).
This algorithm provides the same solution as the one obtained by drawing out the binary voting tree corresponding to a given voting by successive elimination procedure and then solving that tree using the backward algorithm we described earlier. Banks (1985) provides a characterization of the set of outcomes which can emerge as sophisticated outcomes of the voting by successive elimination procedure when every possible ordering of a given feasible set C of candidates is taken into account.
The Banks set
The Banks set associated with a tournament T, denoted BS(T), is de ned by BS(T) = fa j 9 s:t: a = S(C; ; T )g: In order to discuss the characterization of this set given by Banks (1985) , we need some additional de nitions.
A chain of T is a set H C such that T is a transitive relation when restricted to H.
Thus, a chain is a collection of candidates that can be ordered so that each candidate in the order beats all the following candidates in the order.
As a tournament T is generally not transitive on all of C, chains are often strict subsets of C.
Given a candidate a 2 C, an a-chain of T is a chain H with a 2 H such that aTb for all b 2 H. The set of all a-chains is denoted H(a; T).
Thus, an a-chain is a chain where a beats all the other candidates in the chain according to T.
The characterization provided by Banks (1985) can be stated as follows.
Proposition 4 (Banks (1985) ) BS(T) = fa j 9H 2 H(a; T) s:t: 8b = 2 H 9c 2 H s:t: cTbg: Thus, Banks showed that the outcomes that could be elected by varying the ordering (for a xed tournament) when voting by successive elimination correspond to the endpoints of chains, where the chains are such that any candidate not included in the chain is beaten by something in the chain. The intuition behind the characterization is that the candidates in the chain represent the candidates who temporarily \win" at some stage in the voting by successive elimination (the w k 's in the Shepsle-Weingast algorithm), and the remaining candidates are those who are eliminated at their stages.
Part of the reason for allowing to vary in understanding the outcomes of voting by successive elimination is to get a rough feeling for which outcomes can be reached as one varies the agenda. One of the nice features of voting by successive elimination that Banks (1985) demonstrated was that even as the ordering is varied, the sophisticated outcome of voting by successive elimination is always inside the uncovered set and thus is Pareto optimal. We will come back to look at these properties in detail when we make a comparison to what happens with strategic candidacy in Proposition 6 below.
The Candidate Stable Set
We now turn to the detailed analysis of the distortions of the outcomes of voting by successive elimination resulting from strategic candidacy. In particular, we provide an analogous characterization of the Banks set when strategic candidacy is considered.
We know from Section 2 that on the domain e P r , we can treat the voter tournament and candidate preferences as independent. We work on this domain (and Proposition 2 provides conditions under which this domain is non-empty). Further since V (C; P) and e V (P) only depend on P through the tournament T(P), we will denote them simply by V (C; T ) and e V (T) where T is an arbitrary tournament on C.
Since each choice of gives rise to a speci c procedure and since we want to compare the set of outcomes that could arise under strategic candidacy with the Banks set, we introduce the following analog of the Banks set, which we call the candidate stable set.
The candidate stable set associated with a tournament T, denoted CS(T), is de ned by CS(T) = 2 e V (T) Thus, the candidate stable set is found by not only varying the ordering on candidates, but also accounting for strategic choice on the part of candidates for the preferences that they might have, holding the tournament xed. This gives us the precise analog of the Banks set, but accounting for strategic candidacy.
We state a characterization of the candidate stable set which has a close intuitive relationship to the characterization of the Banks set.
Given a tournament T, and fa; bg C; b covers a if bTa and bTc for all c 2 C such that aTc.
Proposition 5 The candidate stable is characterized as follows: CS(T) = fa 2 C j 9H 2 H(a; T ) s:t: 8b = 2 H 9c 2 H s:t: b does not cover cg: Proposition 5 shows that a simple characterization may be found for the candidate stable set, and thus we can account for the strategic impact of candidates' choices and preferences. The characterization bears an intuitive relationship to the characterization of the Banks set. The only change in the characterization is that b not cover c replaces cTb. This enlarges the set of candidates that may be realized, as it follows directly that BS(T) CS(T), since cTb implies b does not cover c.
The intuition behind the result is as follows. First, consider a in the candidate stable set. Let H be the chain corresponding to the candidates that a beats in the elimination procedure. There cannot exist b = 2 H that covers every c in H, otherwise b would be the outcome of the procedure if b entered. Next, consider the converse that every a for which the right hand side of the characterization is true must be in the candidate stable set. Order the elimination procedure according to H, with elements not in H but beaten by an element appearing before H in the ordering, and the remaining elements appearing after H in the ordering. Then it is an equilibrium for only candidates in H and lower in the ordering to enter, and for the remaining candidates not to enter as given their position in the ordering, they can only win if they beat all candidates in H and those beaten by a candidate in H.
We can say much more about the relationship between the candidate stable set and the Banks set, and other well-known sets such as the uncovered set and the top-cycle set. To give precise de nitions, consider the following.
Let aT k b for some k 2 f1; : : : ; #C ? 1g denote the situation where there exists a sequence of candidates a = a 1 ; : : :; a k 0 = b with k + 1 k 0 and a h Ta h+1 for each h 2 f1; : : :; k 0 ? 1g. Thus, aT k b if one can nd a string of candidates of length no more than k + 1 linking a to b, such that each candidate in the string beats the next candidate in the string. This is like an indirect revealed preference relation using T. Let A k (T) = fajaT k b 8b 6 = ag. Thus, A 1 (T) is the Condorcet winner, which is often non-existent. A 2 (T) is the uncovered set, as it is easily seen to be precisely the set of alternatives that are not covered. This set is always non-empty. A #C?1 is the top-cycle set TC(T) de ned earlier. The following relationship then holds. Let UC denote the uncovered set.
Proposition 6 BS(T) UC(T) CS(T) TC(T):
More speci cally
A 1 (T) BS(T) A 2 (T) = UC(T) CS(T) A 3 (T) A #C?1 (T) = TC(T):
There are examples where each relationship is strict
The consideration of strategic candidacy has expanded the set of potential elected candidates, although in a very well-de ned way. Note that the bounds on CS(T) are much sharper than the general bounds of Proposition 3.
Pareto Ine ciency and the Candidate Stable Set
Although Proposition 6 suggests that the e ects of strategic candidacy are slight in one sense (expanding from a subset of A 2 to A 3 ), the following example shows that the expansion due to accounting for strategic candidacy has some negative implications. In particular, since the uncovered set contains only Pareto e cient outcomes (with respect to voters' preferences underlying the corresponding tournament), the Banks Set also only contains Pareto e cient outcomes. However, it turns out that the candidate stable set can include candidates that are not Pareto e cient. More speci cally, in the example the candidate elected under sophisticated voting by successive elimination once strategic candidacy is accounted for is Pareto dominated by the candidate elected if all candidates are forced to enter, considering the preferences of all voters and candidates (except, of course, the preference of the strategic equilibrium candidate himself!). 13 As voting by successive elimination (under sophisticated voting with a xed set of candidates) has been extolled for its e ciency properties, this is a disturbing aspect of strategic candidacy.
Example 1 14 :
Let V = f1; 2; 3g and C = fa 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 ; a 4 ; a 5 g and let the preferences in V be as follows : a 1 P 1 a 3 P 1 a 5 P 1 a 2 P 1 a 4 a 2 P 2 a 4 P 2 a 1 P 2 a 3 P 2 a 5 a 5 P 3 a 2 P 3 a 4 P 3 a 3 P 3 a 1
Then the tournament T = T(P) is as follows : We use the Shepsle-Weingast algorithm to derive the outcome for each set of entering candidates. When all candidates enter, the outcome is a 2 . When only fa 3 ; a 4 g, fa 3 ; a 4 ; a 5 g or fa 1 ; a 3 ; a 4 ; a 5 g enter, the outcome is a 4 . If fa 4 ; a 5 g or fa 2 ; a 3 ; a 4 ; a 5 g enter, the outcome is a 5 .
Let us consider what happens if strategic candidacy is accounted for. Consider the following preferences of candidates. Each candidate ranks herself rst. All candidates other than a 4 rank a 2 higher than a 4 . Also, candidates a 3 and a 2 prefer a 4 to a 5 . Given these preferences, it is an equilibrium (anticipating the subsequent voting) for exactly the set fa 3 ; a 4 ; a 5 g to enter. This results in the outcome of a 4 . However, all voters and candidates (other than a 4 ) prefers a 2 to a 4 . Thus, the outcome under this entry equilibrium is Pareto dominated (except for a 4 's self-preference) by the outcome that would occur if all candidates entered. 15 
Existence of Equilibria in the Candidacy
Game and Mixed Strategies
We have not discussed the issue of existence of equilibrium in the Candidacy Game. Given that in the preceeding analysis we focussed on pure strategy equilibria, it is not obvious that equilibria will always exist. Moreover, even in cases where pure strategy equilibria exist, there may also exist mixed strategy equilibria and these may have di erent properties and so we may want to understand those properties. We now turn to those issues.
Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria
Proposition 3 tells us that for any binary voting procedure and any P 2 e P r , e V (P) is a superset of V (C; P). Thus, there are pro les of candidate preferences for which there exist (pure strategy) Nash equilibria in the candidacy game. It still could be, however, that there are speci c proles of candidate preferences for which there is no pure strategy equilibrium 15 Note that it is not an equilibrium for all candidates to enter.
of the Candidacy game. While we do not know whether this is the case in the class of binary voting procedures, it can happen for some tree voting procedures as we now show.
Proposition 7 If #C 4, there exist tree voting procedures V and P 2 P r such that NE(V; P) = ; Note that it is necessary to have at least 4 candidates for the conclusion of Proposition 7 to be true -with 3 candidates and any voting procedure, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies can be shown to always exist.
While existence of pure strategy equilibrium is a problem for some tree voting procedures, it turns out not to be a problem for voting by successive elimination.
Proposition 8 For all orderings and all P 2 P r , NE(V ; P) 6 = ; where V (A; P) = S(A; ; T(P)).
While Proposition 8 is somewhat reassuring, the next proposition shows that the nonexistence issue is back, even for voting by successive elimination, when we move from Nash equilibrium to the more demanding but quite reasonable concept of undominated Nash equilibrium.
We denote by UNE(V; P) the set of Nash equilibria (in pure strategies) of the candidacy game induced by the voting procedure V and the pro le P 2 P r where for all a 2 C candidate a enters whenever entering weakly dominates not entering or a does not enter whenever not entering weakly dominates entering. 16 Proposition 9 If #C 5, there exist and P 2 P r such that UNE(V ; P) = ; where V (A; P) = S(A; ; T(P)).
Proposition 9 indicates that in order to nd undominated Nash equilibria one may be forced to consider mixed strategy equilibria. Also, even in cases 16 Entering weakly dominates not entering if V (A fag; P)R a V (A; P) for each A, with strict preference for some A. The de nition for not entering weakly dominating entering simply reverses V (A fag; P) and V (A; P). Thus, the notion of domination applies to the Candidacy Game, treating the subsequent voting procedure as a given. Proposition 9 still applies if one de nes domination relative to strategies in the two stage game where voting behavior is taken into account.
where pure strategy (undominated) equilibria exist in the Candidacy Game, one might still like to have some feeling for the properties of mixed strategy equilibria. So, even when existence of (undominated) Nash equilibria in pure strategies is guaranteed, it is legitimate to identify also candidates who have a chance to be elected if such equilibria are played. We now focus on this question.
Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Voting by Successive Elimination
We provide some insight into mixed strategy equilibria for voting by successive elimination.
In order to discuss mixed strategy equilibria, one needs more structure to preferences than the orders over candidates that we have examined so far. Let the preferences of each candidate a 2 C be described by a Von NeumannMorgenstern utility function U a over C. So, U a (b) denotes the utility of candidate a if candidate b is elected. We still work with strict preferences where candidates prefer themselves, so: U a (b) 6 = U a (c) for all b 6 = c and U a (a) > U a (b) for all b 6 = a. Finally we denote by P a the preference over C induced by U a . As before, each voter i 2 V n C is described by a preference P i over C.
Let V be an arbitrary tree or binary voting procedure. As before we assume that the outcome in the voting stage is only determined by the majority tournament T(P) which is assumed to be una ected by changes in the candidate pro le of utility functions U (U a ) a2C . Therefore the choice of an ordering and a tournament T generates a well de ned entry game form which with the addition of U generates a well de ned entry game.
A mixed strategy pro le is now a pro le of probabilities with which each candidate enters p (p a ) a2C where p a 2 0; 1] for all a 2 C. Given a mixed strategy pro le and a set of candidates A C, we denote by p(A) the probability that the set of entrants is A:
(1 ? p a ) 1 A Also, given a 2 C, a candidate subpro le of probabilities p ?a (p b ) b2Cnfag , and A C nfag, we denote by p ?a (A) the probability that the set of entrants out of C n fag is A: We denote by NE(V; U) the set of mixed Nash equilibria of the candidacy game. To isolate the e ects of candidacy, we focus, as before, on the set of situations e P r where candidates are not pivotal in the voting process and we de ne g V m (P) as follows.
e V m (P) = ( a 2 C : 9p and U s.t. p 2 N E(V; U) and a = V(A; P) where p(A) > 0 ) :
So, e V m lists the candidates for which there is a pro le of utility functions and a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding candidacy game such that this candidate is elected with some positive probability. When applied to voting by successive elimination, this leads to the following de nition; the mixed candidate stable set associated with a tournament T, denoted CS m (T) is de ned by :
CS m (T) = e V m (T): The following proposition provides bounds on the set CS m (T).
Proposition 10 For all tournaments T, CS(T) CS m (T) TC(T):
The fact that CS(T) CS m (T) is obvious. The fact that CS m (T) TC(T) follows from the fact that some candidate from the top cycle set will enter with probability one (as otherwise there is a candidate in the top cycle who could enter for sure and win in some circumstances and do as well in other circumstances). It then follows that only candidates in the top cycle can be eventual winners.
We do not know whether Proposition 10 is tight in the sense that we are not sure whether there is a better upper bound on the mixed Candidate Stable set. We have examples of mixed strategy equilibria in the candidacy game, but all of the ones we have been able to construct end up with support in the (pure) Candidate Stable set.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have provided an analysis of the implications of strategic candidacy on the outcome of binary voting procedures, with a detailed look at the prominent case of voting by successive elimination. We have shown endogenizing of the set of candidates expands the sets of candidates who may arise as outcomes of a binary voting procedure, but may introduce ine cient outcomes. We point out some of the questions raised by the analysis here and some aspects of the analysis that deserve further research.
In this paper, we have assumed that the decision to be a candidate was costless. Introducing a candidacy cost, even in nitesimal, leads to a revision of the analysis of the candidacy game. Depending on the context, such costs may be quite natural. With costly candidacy, it is easy to develop examples where the only equilibria of the candidacy game are in mixed strategies, and so this suggests further reason for exploring the mixed strategy of the candidacy game in more detail.
We have also assumed that candidacy decisions are made simultaneously. One can also consider situations where candidacy decisions are sequential: candidates are ordered exogenously and candidates decide to enter or not after having observed the decisions of the candidates before them in the ordering (with a natural ordering being the same ordering as the voting under successive elimination). The order in which candidates make entry decisions will be important in determining the outcome, which is an issue that will have to be dealt with. However, considering a sequential candidacy game has the advantage that it renders the issue of mixed strategies irrelevant.
Finally, as we discussed in the introduction, candidacy issues are part of a broader class of problems in which a set of proposers or nominators suggest the alternatives to be voted upon. In our analysis, each proposer has only one alternative that can be proposed, which in the candidate interpretation is himself or herself. Allowing proposers to each choose from the same ( nite) set of alternatives without being able to duplicate a previous proposal would bring the model in line with that of Groseclose and Krehbiel (1993) (assuming a sequential recognition rule and costs of proposal, as discussed above). This would set the stage for performing the sort of analysis we have done here, but in the context of a legislative model to see what properties the set of outcomes exhibits. The results and intuition developed in this paper pave the way to analyzing that problem.
then V (C; P) 6 = a 1 . A similar reasoning rules out also a 2 and a 3 and therefore C = 2 N E(V; P).
Proof of Proposition 2.
Assume that k is even, and take a; b 2 C with aTb. Let fa 1 ; : : :; a m?2 g = Cnfa; bg, and consider the two linear orderings P ab and P 0 ab de ned as follows: P ab : a b a 1 : a 2 : : : a m?2 P 0 ab : a m?2 a m?3 : : : a 1 a b Consider k+2 2 individuals in V n C with the preference P ab and k+2 2 individuals in V n C with the preference P 0 ab . Repeat the operation for all pairs of candidates. We have assigned a preference to (k+2) The reader can check that this construction yields the desired majority relation.
Proof of Proposition 7.
Let C = fa 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 ; a 4 g and V = f1; 2; 3; 4g. When A = C, consider the voting procedure described by the extensive game form pictured in Figure  1 .
Insert Figure 1 about here
If a candidate does not enter, then just trim the tree to eliminate all terminal nodes that result in that candidate. This de nes the voting procedure for all A C.
Consider the following preference pro le. Preferences of the voters i 2 V are described by a 2 P 1 a 4 P 1 a 1 P 1 a 3 a 4 P 2 a 3 P 2 a 2 P 2 a 1 a 1 P 3 a 4 P 3 a 3 P 3 a 2 a 1 P 4 a 2 P 4 a 3 P 4 a 4
The preferences of the candidates in C are described by a 1 P a 1 a 2 P a 1 a 4 P a 1 a 3 a 2 P a 2 a 1 P a 2 a 3 P a 2 a 4 a 3 P a 3 a 2 P a 3 a 1 P a 3 a 4 a 4 P a 4 a 1 P a 4 a 2 P a 4 a 3 Direct calculation shows that there is no A C for which having exactly the set of candidates in A enter is a candidate entry equilibrium. For example, if all candidates enter, the outcome is a 1 while if a 3 exits then the outcome is a 2 and so a 3 would prefer not to enter. If fa 1 ; a 2 ; a 4 g enter the outcome is b, while if only fa 1 ; a 2 g enter, then the outcome is fa 1 g. Thus a 4 would choose not to enter and so fa 1 ; a 2 ; a 4 g is not an equilibrium. Similar calculations show that there is no A that is a pure strategy entry equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We rst prove that V (C; T ) e V (T) where T = T(P) for some P 2 e P r . Let a 2 V (C; T ) and let P 0 be such that aP 0 b c for all b 6 = a and all c 6 = b and P 0 i = P i for all i 2 VnC. Then clearly : C 2 N E(V; P 0 ) and the claim follows. We now prove that e V (T) TC(T) where T = T(P) for some P 2 e P r . Let a = V (A; T) where A 2 NE(V; P 0 ) and T = T(P 0 ). Assume on the contrary to the claim that a = 2 TC(T). Then it follows from McKelvey and Niemi's theorem that A \ TC(T) = ;; indeed if A \ TC(T) 6 = ;, then (since obviously from the de nition of TC, TC(T j A) 17 TC(T) \ A) we should deduce V (A; T) 6 = a. Let b 2 TC(T). Since from what precedes TC(T j A fbg) = fbg,we deduce from using McKelvey and Niemi 's theorem once more that V (A fbg ; T) = b. Since bP 0 b a, we contradict our assumption that A 2 NE(V; P 0 ).
Proof of Proposition 8.
Fix : C ! f1; 2; : : :; #Cg, and de ne a 1 ; : : :; a #C to be such that (a i ) = i. We claim that the subset A = n a 2 C : a = w k for some k 2 f1; 2; : : :; #Cg o 17 T j A denotes the restriction of T to A.
where w k is the k th provisional winner in the Shepsle-Weingast algorithm belongs to NE(V; P) for all P 2 P r such that T(P) = T: First let a 2 A with a 6 = w 1 ; from the Shepsle-Weingast algorithm applied to An fag, it follows that immediately that V (An fag ; T) = w 1 and therefore it is not pro table for a to exit. Now let a = 2 A; since a 6 = w 1 there exists w k 2 A such that w k Ta. Since k 6 = #C, we deduce from the Shepsle-Weingast algorithm that V (A fag ; T) = w 1 and therefore it is not pro table for a to enter.
Proof of Proposition 9.
The following simple claim will be used in the sequel.
Claim. Fix : C ! f1; 2; : : :; #Cg, and de ne a 1 ; : : : ; a #C to be such that (a i ) = i. Then, the entry strategy always does at least as well for candidates a 1 and a 2 as the no entry strategy.
The claim is true because candidates a 1 and a 2 can change the outcome of the election by dropping out only when they win the election by contesting. Let #C = 5. As in the claim above, let be such that candidate a i comes before candidate a i+1 for all i = 1; 2; 3; 4. So, the claim establishes that a 1 and a 2 always enter the contest in any undominated Nash equilibrium, provided there is some case where they would be elected if they entered, but not if they did not enter. Let T denote the tournament, which is described below 18 . Here, we de ne W(a i ) = fa j ja i Ta j g. That is, W(a i ) is the set of candidates which are \worse" than a i according to the tournament T. Note that (iii) is possible by the transitivity of T on H, since H 2 H(a; T). Thus, candidates in Z come rst under , then candidates in H, and then the remaining candidates. Let us verify that A is an equilibrium and that a = S(A; ; T). First, we check that a = S(A; ; T). Let`= #A and 0 = #H. Ordering the elements in A according to results in the sequence a 1 ; : : : ; a`?`0 = a; : : :; a`, where H = fa`?`0 = a; : : :; a`g. First, note that since H 2 H(a; T), and by the ordering under (iii), it follows that w k = a k for each k `?`0. Then, by the de nition of Z, it follows that w 1 = w`?`0 = a. Thus, a = S(A; ; T). Now let us check that A is an equilibrium, given P and . No candidate in A can bene t from exiting, since each prefers a to any other candidate besides him or herself. Consider a candidate b = 2 A. Given the preference P b (a is b's second most preferred candidate), it su ces to show that S(A fbg; ; T) 6 = b. We know from our original choice of a and H that there exists c 2 H which is not covered by b. Thus, either cTb, or there exists d such that cTdTb. In the second case, note that from the de nition of Z it follows that either d 2 Z or d 2 H. Note that by the ordering , it follows from the Shepsle Weingast formula, for b = S(A fbg; ; T) it must be that bTe for all e 2 A. However, this cannot be due to the existence of c or d as just described.
Proof of Proposition 6.
We show that A 2 (T) CS(T) A 3 (T), and that these inclusions can be strict 19 . First, it is clear that A 2 (T) = UC(T) CS(T), directly from the characterization given in Proposition 5, as any uncovered a is in CS(T) using H = fag. Second, we show that CS(T) A 3 (T). Consider any a 2 CS(T). We need to show that for every b 6 = a, aT 3 b. According We now show that these inclusions can be strict. The tournament T below shows that there exist T for which UC(T) and CS(T) are distinct.
Consider the set of candidates C = fa 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 ; a 4 g and T such that : a 1 Ta 2 Ta 3 Ta 4 Ta 1 , a 4 Ta 2 and a 3 Ta 1 . It is easily checked from Proposition 5 that a 1 2 CS(T), since for the a 1 -chain H = fa 1 ; a 2 g: a 2 Ta 3 and so a 3 cannot cover a 2 , and a 4 does not cover a 2 since a 2 Ta 3 Ta 4 . However, a 1 = 2 UC(T) since it is covered by a 4 .
The tournament T 0 over C = fa 1 ; a 2 ; ::::::::; a 10 g de ned 20 below 21 is such that : CS(T 0 ) 6 = A 3 (T 0 ). a 2 T 0 a 1 ; a 3 T 0 a 1 ; a 4 T 0 a 1 ; a 5 T 0 a 1 ; a 6 T 0 a 1 ; a 7 T 0 a 1 ; a 1 T 0 a 8 ; a 1 T 0 a 9 ; a 1 T 0 a 10 a 5 T 0 a 2 ; a 2 T 0 a 6 ; a 2 T 0 a 7 ; a 2 T 0 a 8 ; a 2 T 0 a 9 ; a 2 T 0 a 10 a 6 T 0 a 3 ; a 3 T 0 a 5 ; a 3 T 0 a 7 ; a 3 T 0 a 8 ; a 3 T 0 a 9 ; a 3 T 0 a 10 a 7 T 0 a 4 ; a 4 T 0 a 5 ; a 4 T 0 a 6 ; a 4 T 0 a 8 ; a 4 T 0 a 9 ; a 4 T 0 a 10 a 8 T 0 a 5 ; a 5 T 0 a 9 ; a 5 T 0 a 10 a 9 T 0 a 6 ; a 6 T 0 a 8 ; a 6 T 0 a 10 a 10 T 0 a 7 ; a 7 T 0 a 8 ; a 7 T 0 a 9 a 10 T 0 a 8 ; a 8 T 0 a 9 a 9 T 0 a 10 It can be easily veri ed that a 1 2 A 3 (T 0 ). Also ffa 1 ; a 8 ; a 9 g; fa 1 ; a 8 ; a 10 g; fa 1 ; a 9 ; a 10 gg is a subset of H(a; T 0 ) and any other H in H(a; T 0 ) is a subset of one of these sets. In order to verify that a 1 = 2 CS(T 0 ), it su ces to look at only these sets. Now a 2 covers a 1 , a 9 and a 10 , a 3 covers a 1 , a 8 and a 10 , a 4 covers a 1 , a 8 and a 9 .
It follows immediately that a 1 = 2 CS(T 0 ).
Proof of Proposition 10:
Let be an ordering, U be a candidate pro le of utility functions, and T be a tournament. To simplify notation, we assume that the ordering is the natural ordering of 1; 2; :::::::; #C. Let i be the smallest integer such that i 2 TC(T). Now consider a candidate pro le of probabilities p that is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies of the candidacy game. Further, the above inequality is strict whenever for all j 2 C i (p) such that jTi, p j < 1. Therefore either p j < 1 for all j 2 C i (p) such that jTi, and then from the argument above entry is the unique best reply of candidate i (i.e., p i = 1); or there exists j 2 C i (p) such that: jTi and p j = 1. Note that any such j must belong to TC(T) since jTi and i 2 TC(T). From the Shepsle-Weingast formula, this is enough to conclude that no candidate outside TC(T) can belong to CS m (T). 
